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 Looking Backward, Looking 
Forward: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Decision in R. v. Ipeelee 
Jonathan Rudin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada released its deci-
sion in the appeals of R. v. Ipeelee and R. v. Ladue.1 The decision, almost 
13 years to the day since the Court issued its landmark decision in R. v. 
Gladue,2 clearly restated the Court’s insistence that judges are under a 
positive duty to take the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders into 
account in sentencing in all cases. 
The decision goes beyond Gladue in its analysis, its acknowledg-
ment of the realities of colonialism and its strong defence of the need to 
sentence Aboriginal offenders differently.3 The Court also acknowledges 
that judicial uptake of Gladue has not been what the Court had expected 
and the decision urges judges to redouble their efforts in this area. 
This restatement and expansion of the Court’s position came at a 
time when the ability of judges to actually meaningfully take Gladue into 
account is challenged by a raft of amendments to the Criminal Code4 
significantly restricting the discretion of judges in sentencing. 
This paper will look at the Ipeelee decision in two ways. First, it will 
discuss the way in which the decision has addressed some current 
controversies with respect to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders. 
Second, the decision will be examined to see what it might portend for 
                                                                                                             
 Jonathan Rudin is the Program Director at Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto and a 
part-time faculty member in the Department of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies at York 
University. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s and are not to be attributed to any 
organization with which he may be associated. 
1 [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, 2012 SCC 13 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”]. 
2 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”]. 
3 The decision in Ipeelee is, I believe, the first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
that capitalizes the word Aboriginal — in all previous decisions, it was spelled with a lower case “a”. 
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 challenges to recent amend-
ments to the Criminal Code, including those contained in the omnibus 
criminal legislation found in Bill C-10, which was passed in 2012.6 
At the outset, it is probably necessary to situate myself, as the author 
of the paper, in this discussion. The issue of Aboriginal people and the 
criminal system has occupied much of my time, both professionally and 
academically, for over 20 years. Among other things, I was counsel for 
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto and appeared as an intervener in 
Ipeelee. I would hope that this fact will not cause a reader to dismiss the 
paper at the outset as being biased or slanted. Authors have opinions, and 
those opinions are often formed, sometimes in rarefied (or perhaps less 
rarefied than imagined) academic worlds, or in the trenches of the courts. 
Regardless of how or why opinions are formed, the strength of an article 
such as this should be judged on its content and intellectual rigour rather 
than on the imagined biases of the author. 
II. LOOKING BACKWARD 
In Ipeelee, the Supreme Court explicitly addressed two issues that 
have caused some concern and confusion among trial and appellate 
courts with respect to the interpretation of section 718.2(e) of the 
Criminal Code and Gladue. First, the Court stated unequivocally that the 
Gladue analysis was required in all cases; the fact that an offence might 
be serious and/or violent did not obviate the need to examine the circum-
stances of the offender and even in those cases, the sentence for an 
Aboriginal offender may well differ from that of a non-Aboriginal 
offender.7 
The other long-standing issue that the Court put to rest was whether 
or not a direct connection had to be shown between the circumstances of 
the offender and the specific offence. The Court made clear that such 
direct connections were not necessary and rarely could be proven.8 
The Court also appears to have rebutted three more recent challenges 
to the Gladue analysis. The term “appears” is used here because while 
the Court does not specifically allude to the arguments in the decision, 
the reasons they provide certainly address them. The three arguments are: 
                                                                                                             
5 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
6 Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 [hereinafter “Bill C-10”]. 
7 Supra, note 1, at paras. 84 -87. 
8 Id., at paras. 81-83. 
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(1) the Arcand 9 analysis from the Alberta Court of Appeal that raises 
proportionality as the first among equals in the sentencing objectives 
found throughout section 718; (2) the notion that Aboriginal over-
representation does not really exist; and (3) that the causes of Aboriginal 
over-representation (assuming that it exists at all) are too complex to be 
addressed in the sentencing process. 
1. R. v. Arcand 
In Arcand10 the Alberta Court of Appeal issued a judgment that it 
stated would confront the truth about sentencing.11 For the Court, the 
1996 sentencing amendments were all about proportionality. Proportion-
ality, it found, was “the only governing sentencing principle under the 
Code”.12 What is more, proportionality was the bulwark against unprin-
cipled judges simply imposing their preferred sentences by picking and 
choosing from the menu of sentencing objectives found throughout 
section 718. It was this tendency, the Court found, that brought sentenc-
ing decisions into public disrepute and risked calling down increased 
parliamentary direction.13 
In Arcand, the Court reviewed the decision of the trial judge to sen-
tence a young Aboriginal man to a 90-day intermittent sentence for a 
sexual assault. In the appeal, the Court never specifically mentions the 
role of section 718.2(e) in the sentencing process. 
The Court in Ipeelee agrees that: 
The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is 
intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — the 
maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition 
of just sanctions.14 
Unlike the Alberta Court of Appeal, however, the Ipeelee Court has no 
trouble reconciling the principle of proportionality with the need to 
recognize the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. They state: 
                                                                                                             
9 R. v. Arcand, [2010] A.J. No. 1383, 2010 ABCA 363 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Arcand”]. 
10 For a more detailed critique of the Arcand decision, see Jonathan Rudin, “Eyes Wide 
Shut: The Alberta Court of Appeal’s Decision in R. v. Arcand and Aboriginal Offenders” (2011) 
48:4 Alta. L. Rev. 987 [hereinafter “Rudin, ‘Eyes Wide Shut’”], and a subsequent decision of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal itself in R. v. Lee, [2012] A.J. No. 41, 2012 ABCA 17 (Alta. C.A.). 
11 Arcand, supra, note 9, at para. 8. 
12 Id., at para. 47. 
13 Id., at para. 8. 
14 Ipeelee, supra, note 1, at para. 37 (footnotes omitted). 
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Section 718.2(e) is therefore properly seen as a “direction to members 
of the judiciary to inquire into the causes of the problem and to 
endeavour to remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is possible through 
the sentencing process”. Applying the provision does not amount to 
“hijacking the sentencing process in the pursuit of other goals.” The 
purpose of sentencing is to promote a just, peaceful and safe society 
through the imposition of just sanctions that, among other things, deter 
criminality and rehabilitate offenders, all in accordance with the 
fundamental principle of proportionality. Just sanctions are those that 
do not operate in a discriminatory manner. Parliament, in enacting 
section 718.2(e), evidently concluded that nothing short of a specific 
direction to pay particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal 
offenders would suffice to ensure that judges undertook their duties 
properly.15 
2. The Revisionist Approach to Over-representation 
Recently, the Attorney General of Ontario mounted a challenge to the 
idea that Aboriginal over-representation has any significance whatsoever. 
In R. v. B. (T.M.),16 a Charter challenge to mandatory minimum sentences 
for Aboriginal offenders,17 the province took the position that figures on 
over-representation represented “census-benchmarking”18 and were a 
crude and unsophisticated measure with no particular significance. Over-
representation could be explained as a result of the particular demo-
graphic factors that were unique to the Aboriginal population, such as the 
fact that the Aboriginal population is younger overall than the general 
Canadian population.19 The province reiterated this position in oral 
argument before the Supreme Court in Ipeelee,20 and thus the issue was 
squarely before the Court when they wrote their decision.21 
                                                                                                             
15 Id., at para. 68. 
16 [2011] O.J. No. 4836, 2011 ONCJ 528 (Ont. C.J.) [hereinafter “T.M.B.”]. 
17 And a case where I represented ALST as an intervener at the Ontario Court of Justice and 
now on appeal. 
18 Census benchmarking refers, in this case, to comparing numbers of Aboriginal people to 
non-Aboriginal people in a particular population and drawing conclusions based on the results of 
that comparison. T.M.B., supra, note 16, at para. 31. 
19 T.M.B., supra, note 16, at paras. 40-42. 
20 Manasie Ipeelee v. Her Majesty the Queen, Transcription of Compact Disc, October 17, 
2011, A.S.A.P. Reporting Services, at 35-36. 
21 The Crown also argued in T.M.B., although not at the Supreme Court of Canada, that the 
word “colonialism” is vague and has no discernible meaning: see T.M.B., supra, note 16, at para. 43. 
In Ipeelee the Court expressly refers to the impacts of colonialism on Aboriginal people on a number 
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The issue of the extent to which Aboriginal over-representation could 
be explained by demographic factors was considered in a 2009 study 
conducted by Statistics Canada entitled “The Incarceration of Aboriginal 
People in Adult Correctional Services”. The report concluded that while 
demographic factors played a role in explaining levels of Aboriginal 
over-representation, they were not sufficient to explain the phenomenon 
completely.22 In her decision in T.M.B., Sparrow J. concluded as well that 
Aboriginal over-representation could not be explained simply by refer-
ence to demographic factors.23 
The Supreme Court expressly rejects the argument that over-
representation cannot be determined by looking at the percentage of 
Aboriginal people in prison. The Court states: 
In the immediate aftermath of Bill C-41, from 1996 to 2001, Aboriginal 
admissions to custody increased by 3 percent while non-Aboriginal 
admissions declined by 22 percent. ... From 2001 to 2006, there was an 
overall decline in prison admissions of 9 percent. During that same 
time period, Aboriginal admissions to custody increased by 4 percent. 
As a result, the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal 
justice system is worse than ever. Whereas Aboriginal persons made up 
12 percent of all federal inmates in 1999 when Gladue was decided, 
they accounted for 17 percent of federal admissions in 2005. ... As 
Professor Rudin asks: “If Aboriginal overrepresentation was a crisis in 
1999, what term can be applied to the situation today?”24 
3. The Role of Sentencing in the Over-representation of Aboriginal 
Offenders 
On February 28, 2012, the Senate released their report on Bill C-10 
— the omnibus crime bill that increased the number and range of 
mandatory minimum sentences and restricted access to conditional 
sentences for all but the most minor of offences.25 A number of witnesses 
who appeared before the Senate spoke of the likely significant impact of 
                                                                                                             
of occasions, and it appears safe to say that this argument too has now been rejected by the Court: 
see Ipeelee, supra, note 1, at paras. 60, 77. 
22  Samuel Perreault, “The Incarceration of Aborginal People in Adult Correctional Services” 
(2009) 29:3 Juristat 5, at 12. 
23 T.M.B., supra, note 16, at para. 119. 
24 Ipeelee, supra, note 1, at para. 62 (footnotes omitted). 
25 Bill C-10 will be discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
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the bill on increasing rates of Aboriginal over-representation.26 In its 
report, the Senate acknowledged this concern but dismissed its relevance 
to Bill C-10: 
Another concern that was expressed forcefully and often in the course 
of the hearings on Bill C-10 was the over-representation of Aboriginals, 
both as victims and in the correctional systems. This over-
representation needs to be addressed on an urgent basis. This is a 
problem that goes beyond the criminal justice system and will require a 
major societal effort involving all levels of government and community 
organizations.27 
Unlike the decision in Arcand, which received a great deal of public-
ity,28 or the argument against over-representation statistics which was put 
before the Court, there is no reason to assume that the Court was aware 
of this rather disingenuous response from the Senate. The Court, how-
ever, did make clear, in express terms, that while there are many causes 
of Aboriginal over-representation, some of which are beyond the purview 
of the legal system, that system has a role to play in reducing over-
representation. 
As we have seen, the direction to pay particular attention to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders was included in light of 
evidence of their overrepresentation in Canada’s prisons and jails. This 
overrepresentation led the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba to 
ask in its Report: “Why, in a society where justice is supposed to be 
blind, are the inmates of our prisons selected so overwhelmingly from a 
single ethnic group? Two answers suggest themselves immediately: 
either Aboriginal people commit a disproportionate number of crimes, 
or they are the victims of a discriminatory justice system” ... The 
available evidence indicates that both phenomena are contributing to 
the problem (RCAP). Contrary to Professors Stenning and Roberts, 
addressing these matters does not lie beyond the purview of the 
sentencing judge. 
First, sentencing judges can endeavour to reduce crime rates in 
Aboriginal communities by imposing sentences that effectively deter 
criminality and rehabilitate offenders. These are codified objectives of 
sentencing. To the extent that current sentencing practices do not 
                                                                                                             
26 Christa Big Canoe, Legal Advocacy Director at Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto, 
appeared before the Committee as a witness. 
27 See <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/411/lcjc/rep/rep09feb12-e.htm>. 
28 Rudin, “Eyes Wide Shut”, supra, note 10, at 989. 
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further these objectives, those practices must change so as to meet the 
needs of Aboriginal offenders and their communities ... 
Second, judges can ensure that systemic factors do not lead 
inadvertently to discrimination in sentencing ... Sentencing judges, as 
front-line workers in the criminal justice system, are in the best position 
to re-evaluate these criteria to ensure that they are not contributing to 
ongoing systemic racial discrimination.29 
The specific nature of the role judges can play as front-line workers 
in the justice system in addressing the realities of Aboriginal over-
representation is challenged by legislation such as Bill C-10, and it is to 
that issue that the paper will now turn its attention. 
III. LOOKING FORWARD 
There is no question that Ipeelee is more than just a strong re-
statement of Gladue. For those concerned with increasing levels of 
Aboriginal over-representation over time — to the point where now 
approximately one-quarter of inmates in custody in Canada are Aborigi-
nal,30 Ipeelee is a major step forward. In its clarification of some of the 
confusion that arose following Gladue, and in its repudiation of those 
academics and judges who have sought to minimize or trivialize that 
decision, the Court has made clear that addressing Aboriginal over-
representation is properly the responsibility of all those in the justice 
system. 
Tempering this enthusiasm for the Court’s approach is the fact that 
with the passage of Bill C-10, the ability of judges to actually implement 
Gladue and Ipeelee in a meaningful way has been severely constrained. 
Bill C-10 continues a trend that sees the sentence length of existing 
mandatory minimum sentences increased, and new mandatory minimums 
created. Where new mandatory minimums are not created, the ability of 
judges to rely on conditional sentences has been restricted because those 
sentences are now available for only a few minor offences. 
Bill C-10 now more than ever turns Crown attorneys into judges. It is 
the decisions of Crowns as to what charges to prosecute that will largely 
determine what sentencing options are available for judges. Unlike 
                                                                                                             
29 R. v. Ipeelee, supra, note 1, at paras. 65-67. 
30 In 2008/2009 Aboriginal people made up 27 per cent of admissions to provincial custody 
and 18 per cent of admissions to federal custody: D. Calverly, “Adult Correctional Services in 
Canada, 2008/09” (Fall 2010) 30:3 Juristat 11. 
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decisions of judges, however, decisions by the Crown as to what charges 
to proceed with are generally unreviewable.31 
It is these changes in the legal landscape that have now made resort 
to the Charter to challenge mandatory minimums (and perhaps restric-
tions on access to conditional sentences) more necessary than ever. As 
opposed to most previous Charter challenges to mandatory minimums, 
which were based on the deprivation of liberty under section 7 and cruel 
and unusual punishment under section 12, these challenges will likely 
have to enter new territory and rely on the equality provisions of section 
15. Before looking at how section 15 might be used in such challenges, it 
is important to briefly review the section 7 and section 12 jurisprudence 
with relation to mandatory minimums. 
1. Challenges to Mandatory Minimums under Section 7 and 
Section 1232 
R. v. Smith33 in 1987 was the first successful challenge of a manda-
tory minimum. The minimum in this case was seven years’ imprisonment 
for the importation of any amount of a narcotic into Canada. In finding 
that the minimum violated section 12 of the Charter, the Court set out a 
four-part test to determine that the punishment in this case was “grossly 
disproportionate”. The test involved weighing the gravity of the offence, 
the characteristics of the offender, the circumstances of the case and the 
effect of punishment on the offender.34 
What weighed heavily in the Court’s determination was that the re-
sults in a particular case could be dramatically different depending on the 
exercise of Crown discretion. For example, if someone were arrested 
coming into Canada with a small amount of marijuana the Crown could 
choose to prosecute the person for simple possession of a narcotic. In 
such a case the person might not receive any jail time whatsoever. On the 
other hand, if the Crown, in its unfettered discretion, chose to prosecute 
                                                                                                             
31 See, e.g., R. v. Power, [1994] S.C.J. No. 29, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.); Miazga v. 
Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.J. No. 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.); R. v. Smythe, [1971] S.C.J. No. 
62, [1971] S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.). 
32 For a more nuanced and sophisticated approach to this issue, please see Kent Roach, 
“The Charter versus the Government’s Crime Agenda” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) (forthcoming). 
33 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”]. 
34 Id., at para. 56. The Court allowed that this could be done by way of a reasonable hypo-
thetical set of facts rather than relying on the specific circumstances of the offender. 
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the offence of importation, then the judge would have no choice but to 
impose the seven-year minimum.35 
In 2000, in R. v. Morrisey,36 the Supreme Court upheld the four-year 
mandatory minimum for criminal negligence causing death with a 
firearm. The Court found that the offence required proof of wanton and 
reckless disregard for life and safety — a high threshold that only served 
to punish those who used firearms in a marked departure from the 
general standard of care.37 Unlike Smith then, the simple act itself of 
causing a death with a firearm did not attract the minimum sentence. 
In 2008 in R. v. Ferguson,38 the Supreme Court found the four-year 
mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm (a very similar type 
of offence to that in Morrisey) to be constitutional. In Ferguson, the 
appellant, a police officer who shot and killed a suspect in a cell during 
an altercation, asked that the mandatory minimum be found to be cruel 
and unusual punishment as against him based on his personal circum-
stances. He then sought a constitutional exemption from the operation of 
the law under section 24(1) of the Charter as opposed to relying on 
section 52 to strike down the legislation, as was done in Smith. 
The Court concluded that constitutional exemptions were not the 
proper response to Charter violations caused by mandatory minimum 
sentences. If the specific facts of a case occasioned a finding that the 
sentence violated section 7 or section 12, then the law should be struck 
down.39 Essentially, a unique set of facts should be treated as a reason-
able hypothetical as opposed to allowing a particular person’s circum-
stances to allow only that person to avoid the sanction. In the end, the 
Court upheld the four-year minimum as they did in Morrisey.40 
In R. v. Smickle41 in 2012, Molloy J. of the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice found the three-year mandatory minimum contained in section 
95(1) of the Criminal Code for possession of a loaded firearm, if the 
offence were prosecuted by indictment, to be unconstitutional.42 This 
offence is one of the more recent mandatory minimums that are hybrid 
                                                                                                             
35 Here the Court relied on a reasonable hypothetical to find the Charter violation. If the law 
is unconstitutional in a reasonably hypothetical situation, then it is unconstitutional in all cases. 
36 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”]. 
37 Id., at para. 1. 
38 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”]. 
39 Id., at para. 13. 
40 Id., at para. 30. 
41 [2012] O.J. No. 612, 110 O.R. (3d) 25 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Smickle”]. The Crown 
has appealed the sentence in this case to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The appeal will be heard along 
with R. v. Nur, referred to later in this article, and R. v. Wong. 
42 Smickle, id., at para. 9. 
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offences and where penalties differ significantly depending on how the 
matter is proceeded with. 
In the case of a violation of section 95(1), if the Crown proceeds 
summarily, there is no mandatory minimum and the maximum penalty is 
one year’s imprisonment. As noted however, if the Crown proceeds by 
indictment, the minimum penalty is three years’ imprisonment. This two-
year gap between the maximum summary and the minimum indictable 
punishment was one of the main reasons the law was found to be 
unconstitutional. 
In R. v. Nur,43 another challenge to this section, Code J. of the On-
tario Superior Court of Justice found the law to be constitutional, 
although he too was troubled by the sentencing disparities between the 
summary and indictable offence. He was satisfied by the Crown’s 
argument that its discretion as to how to prosecute the offence would 
mean that reasonable hypotheticals that would find a three-year sentence 
to be oppressive in some circumstances would be addressed through the 
use of Crown discretion to prosecute the matter summarily. While Code 
J. accepted this argument, he indicated that if that did not prove to be the 
case, then the section was susceptible to challenge.44 
Smickle was just the case. The Crown proceeded by indictment be-
cause its theory of the case suggested that the behaviour of the offender 
attracted a mandatory sentence. During the trial, however, it became 
clear that the Crown’s version of events was incorrect and that the 
offender had engaged in foolish but not particularly dangerous or risky 
behaviour.45 Having made the election to proceed by indictment, how-
ever, the Crown did not have the ability to charge the offender with the 
offence that his behaviour actually deserved and thus, absent the Court’s 
finding that the section was unconstitutional, the offender would have 
gone to jail for three years. 
2. Charter Challenge of Mandatory Minimums Based on Section 15 
A Charter challenge to mandatory minimums for Aboriginal offend-
ers would likely not be grounded on section 7 or section 12. It is not 
necessarily going to be the case that a mandatory minimum sentence for 
an Aboriginal person amounts to cruel and unusual punishment while the 
                                                                                                             
43 [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 2011 ONSC 4874 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
44 Id., at para. 114. 
45 Smickle, supra, note 41, at paras. 17-19. 
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same sentence for a non-Aboriginal person would attract no Charter 
scrutiny.46 
A Charter challenge to mandatory minimums for Aboriginal offend-
ers could, however, be based on the section 15 equality provisions of the 
Charter. Such a challenge would be grounded on the fact that the impact 
of the minimums on Aboriginal offenders exacerbates the discrimination 
they already face in the criminal justice system. 
As noted earlier in this paper, the Court in Ipeelee specifically found 
that Aboriginal people face discrimination in the criminal justice system 
and it is the responsibility of the sentencing judge to address that dis-
crimination. To repeat the Court’s finding: 
Sentencing judges, as front-line workers in the criminal justice system, 
are in the best position to re-evaluate these criteria to ensure that they 
are not contributing to ongoing systemic racial discrimination.47 
Until recently, the findings by the Supreme Court regarding the exis-
tence of systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system faced by 
Aboriginal offenders has not attracted a great deal of judicial attention.48 
As long as judges were generally free to set the sentences they found to 
be appropriate for Aboriginal offenders based on the provisions of 
section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, reference was generally not 
necessary to the systemic discrimination faced by Aboriginal people in 
the justice system. The specific sentences for specific offenders were 
grounded on the circumstances of that offender — both those specific to 
that person and those more general that have had an impact on the person 
and his or her community. 
But mandatory minimum sentences change all that. Where a manda-
tory minimum is involved, judges do not have the ability to choose the 
sentence that is most appropriate for the particular offender unless that 
sentence falls at or above the minimum sentence. Mandatory minimums 
require judges, in some circumstances, to sentence an Aboriginal 
                                                                                                             
46 However, the finding by the Supreme Court in Gladue that prison for Aboriginal offend-
ers may be more difficult than for other offenders based, in part, on the racism that is 
“rampant” in prisons cannot be ignored. Recent reports by the Office of the Correctional Investiga-
tor indicate the concerns expressed by the Court in 1999 have not abated: see, e.g., Office of the 
Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator 2009-2010, section 4, 
online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20092010-eng.aspx#2.4>. 
47 Ipeelee, supra, note 1, at para. 67. 
48 Ipeelee was not the first occasion that the Supreme Court has spoken of the discrimina-
tion faced by Aboriginal people in the justice system. The Court first raised the issue in R. v. 
Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 58 (S.C.C.) and again the next year in 
R. v. Gladue, supra, note 2, at para. 68. 
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offender to a sentence that is greater than they otherwise would have in 
considering section 718.2(e). 
This concern with minimum sentences is not, however, restricted to 
Aboriginal offenders. Nor is consideration of section 718.2(e) restricted 
to Aboriginal offenders. While the section is often referred to as the 
Aboriginal sentencing section, as the Court makes clear in Ipeelee, 
section 718.2(e) applies to all offenders.49 Why then would Aboriginal 
people then be able to mount a section 15 challenge to a law that affects 
everyone in the same way? 
The difference is that it is only Aboriginal people who, the Supreme 
Court has found, face systemic discrimination throughout the criminal 
justice system. Non-Aboriginal offenders deal with a justice system 
where it is assumed they will be treated in a non-discriminatory manner; 
that is not the case for Aboriginal offenders. A reasonable Aboriginal 
person who has read the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada (as 
well as the many reports on Aboriginal people and the justice system) 
would be perfectly within his or her rights to conclude that those with 
power in the justice system make decisions based on negative stereotypes 
regarding Aboriginal people — and these decisions can have a significant 
impact on the lives of Aboriginal people in the justice system. 
The reality is that offence categories within the Criminal Code are 
not watertight compartments. For example, the crime of sexual interfer-
ence, which carries a mandatory minimum, is also encapsulated in the 
crime of sexual assault, which does not carry a mandatory minimum. A 
Crown who wishes to preserve all the options available to the sentencing 
judge may choose to proceed on a sexual assault charge, while a Crown 
who wishes to ensure that the offender goes to jail will proceed with the 
sexual interference charge. Either decision is justifiable, and since it is 
the decision of the Crown, it is generally not subject to review. But what 
happens when this decision is made with respect to an Aboriginal person 
— a person who is subject to systemic discrimination in the justice 
system? 
The Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry addressed the issue of the 
way in which those with power in the justice system exercise their 
discretion with respect to Aboriginal people: 
A significant part of the problem is the inherent biases of those with 
decision-making or discretionary authority in the justice system. 
Unconscious attitudes and perceptions are applied when making 
                                                                                                             
49 Ipeelee, supra, note 1, at para. 77. 
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decisions. Many opportunities for subjective decision making exist 
within the justice system and there are few checks on the subjective 
criteria being used to make those decisions. We believe that part of the 
problem is that while Aboriginal people are the objects of such 
discretion within the justice system, they do not “benefit” from 
discretionary decision making, and that even the well-intentioned 
exercise of discretion can lead to inappropriate results because of 
cultural or value differences. ... 
However one understands discrimination, it is clear that Aboriginal 
people have been subject to it. They clearly have been the victims of 
the openly hostile bigot and they also have been victims of 
discrimination that is unintended, but is rooted in policy and law.50 
It is here that the issue is joined. Aboriginal people face discrimina-
tion in the criminal justice system. That discrimination must include the 
decisions by Crown attorneys as to what charges to prosecute against an 
Aboriginal offender. If the offence prosecuted contains a mandatory 
minimum, then in a case where the judge would otherwise not sentence 
the offender to that minimum (or more), the role of the judge as the front-
line worker charged with preventing further discrimination against 
Aboriginal people in the justice system is frustrated. 
As with Smith and Smickle, this challenge to mandatory minimums is 
grounded on the exercise of Crown discretion. As with those cases, this 
challenge does not mount an assault on the exercise of Crown discretion 
itself. It is not suggested that judges should look behind the exercise of 
the Crown discretion and challenge the decisions that were made. Rather, 
the existence of systemic discrimination towards Aboriginal people 
means that section 15 requires that judges ensure that in making the 
decision they alone are empowered to make — the sentencing decision 
— they are not contributing to the discrimination faced by Aboriginal 
people. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 15 is not the lever with which to change the world. Judges 
cannot be expected to rewrite the operations of the justice system to 
ensure the elimination of all discrimination towards Aboriginal people. 
                                                                                                             
50 Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission, Report: Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of 
Manitoba (Winnipeg: Manitoba Provincial Government, 1999), at ch. 4, online: <http://www.ajic.mb.ca/
volume.html>. 
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However, given the fact that the Supreme Court has found that Aborigi-
nal people face discrimination in the criminal justice system, what is a 
judge to do when mandatory minimum sentencing laws mean that 
unreviewable decisions of judicial actors such as Crowns can constrain 
the decisions of judges, whose decisions are public and subject to 
appellate review? What should be the response of a judge to mandatory 
minimum sentences that must, in some way, inevitably exacerbate the 
problem of Aboriginal over-representation? 
If the answer is that judges can do nothing, that section 15 is of no 
use at all to individuals who clearly face systemic discrimination, then 
what is the point of the court finding that such discrimination exists? 
What is the use of all the high-toned rhetoric about the significance of 
section 15 and the equality rights guarantee, when Aboriginal people 
cannot rely on that guarantee to try to stop a worsening situation that the 
Supreme Court has already declared a crisis? 
The Ipeelee decision builds on previous decisions of the Supreme 
Court with regard to Aboriginal over-representation and the discrimina-
tion Aboriginal people face in the justice system. Bill C-10 builds on the 
trend to take decision-making powers away from sentencing judges and 
place it more and more in the hands of those whose decisions are not 
subject to review. The lines are now drawn more starkly than ever before, 
and it is likely that sooner rather than later the courts will have to come 
to grips with this reality. 
